FUNDAMENTALNAYA I PRIKLADNAYA MATEMATIKA

(FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS)

2002, VOLUME 8, NUMBER 4, PAGES 1111-1128

Equilibrium and Pareto-optimality in noisy non-zero sum discrete duel

L. N. Positselskaya

Abstract

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We study a non-zero sum game which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy one-versus-one duel. Equilibrium and $$e-equilibrium points are presented in explicit form. It is shown that the $$e-equilibrium strategies of both players coincide with their $$e-maxmin strategies. We give the conditions under which the equilibrium strategy is a maxmin strategy. Pareto optimal games are investigated.

All articles are published in Russian.

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